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the Financial Crisis
Abstract
During the Global Financial Crisis, central banks attempted to counter the economic downturn by reinforcing
their conventional policy toolset with an extensive range of unconventional monetary policies. Paramount
amongst these policies was Quantitative Easing (QE), which involves the creation of electronic money to
conduct large-scale asset purchases. QE has been accused of increasing economic inequality from multiple
political standpoints. By analytically weighing QE’s effects on different groups of households, this paper
attempts to establish whether the Federal Reserve System, the European Central Bank and the Bank of
England fostered income and wealth inequality during the post-crisis period in the areas under these
institutions’ purview. Before proceeding with this analysis, this paper also outlines the interplays existing
between inequality and conventional monetary policy to counter central bankers’ established view that
inequality should be considered an irrelevant by-product of their policy choices. When looking at QE, this
paper argues that this policy fostered a divergence between the relative performances of financial markets and
the rest of the economy, which consequently increased inequality. QE was designed with a bias towards
effectively supporting financial markets, on which few wealthy households depend. As the benefits accrued by
financial markets did not trickle-down; this policy was relatively ineffective at supporting the rest of the
economy, on which the majority of households rely.
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I. Introduction 
 
“There are 1011 stars in the galaxy. That used to be a huge number. But it's only a hundred 
billion. It's less than the national deficit! We used to call them astronomical numbers. Now 
we should call them economical numbers”. 
 
Richard Feynman – Nobel Prize in Physics (The Economist 2011) 
 
One may not have to search afar to find examples revealing the monumental scales to which 
economists have become accustomed. Beyond national deficits, the cumulative number of 
United States (US) dollars, pounds and euros injected into financial markets by the Federal 
Reserve System (Fed), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England (BoE) to 
revive their respective economies following the Global Financial Crisis was on the scale of 
trillions, thus 1012.1 Amidst the crisis, central banks reacted rapidly to counter the downturn 
by utilizing a wide range of conventional and unconventional monetary policy (UMP) tools. 
In turn, the three central banks under study established two historical records: one for 
reaching their lowest interest rate levels and the second for expanding their balance sheets in 
previously unseen ways in absolute terms (Haldane 2014:3). The principal cause of the 
second record and the most noteworthy policy carried out by central banks during this period 
has been the so-called Quantitative Easing (QE); a perplexingly cryptic term commonly 
defined as central banks’ creation of electronic money to conduct large-scale asset purchases 
within financial markets (Bean 2014:2). The rationale for QE’s implementation was that 
markets needed to be stimulated further relative to what could be achieved by using solely 
conventional monetary policy, which, as Section III will explain, had become almost 
impotent when interest rates approached the zero boundary. 
While QE was intended to spur economic growth and inflation, its implementation 
has sparked numerous fears. Amongst these, inequality has gained a prominent stance as 
central bankers have been challenged for potently intruding into the world of redistributive 
policies, theoretically confined to democratically appointed fiscal policymakers (The 
Economist 2015b). Critics from a wide political and national spectrum have blamed the 
officials at the helm of central banks of unintentionally, yet decisively enhancing the pre-
existent historical trend of rising inequality by favouring the recovery of financial markets 
                                                          
1 Although Quantitative Easing has also been implemented by the Swedish Riksbank and by the Bank of Japan, 
this paper focuses exclusively on the operations conducted by the Fed, ECB and BoE, as the surveys on 
households’ finances in the areas under these three banks’ purview are relatively more accessible and 
comparable. 
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 and by failing to generate an inclusive growth path (Bernanke 2015; Wolf 2014:375). QE’s 
disparate opponents have included central bankers such as Kevin Warsh who has accused the 
Fed of operating a “reverse Robin Hood” policy to enrich wealthy financial asset owners, 
left-wing politicians such as Jeremy Corbyn who has campaigned for a more egalitarian form 
of QE in the United Kingdom (UK), as well as right-wing politicians such as Mitt Romney 
who has argued for an auditing process to reconsider central banks’ independence (Bivens 
2015b:2; The Economist 2015b). 
As Atkinson (2015:1) explains, the topic of inequality has been “at the forefront of 
public debates”, while also gaining a “priority” status within the agendas of policymakers in 
most developed countries. One should note that inequality is a broad concept whose 
relevance varies according to the ways it is defined and measured (Wilkinson and Pickett 
2010:17). Nonetheless, inequality has been pushed at the centre-stage of policymakers’ 
agenda, especially in the US and UK, due to its dramatic rise since the 1980s in terms of the 
two most widely used metrics: income and wealth inequality (Giles 2015; Wilkinson and 
Pickett 2010:239). The former looks at the distribution of incomes and the latter at the 
distribution of assets within a population (IPS 2016). Income inequality in the US, for 
instance, has reached unprecedented levels since its first known records, as the richest one 
percent have accrued sixty percent of the total increase in gross domestic product (GDP) 
between 1977 and 2007, while leaving approximately ninety per cent of the population with 
close to stagnant wages (Piketty 2014:297; Stiglitz 2013:4). 
Despite inequality’s rise, economists have generally ignored this topic in studies 
conducted during the second half of the twentieth-century (Atkinson 2015:15; Rajan 
2010:18). As Bauman (2011:9) declares in his book Collateral Damage, inequality has 
repeatedly been “relegated to the status of ‘collaterality’”, implying that this phenomenon is 
considered a marginal side effect of achieving the relatively more important ends which 
monopolize economists’ mental bandwidth. Amongst these, economic growth has dominated 
to the extent that, according to Kuznets’s theory, income inequality was expected to decrease 
as a country reached its later stages of development where “growth is a rising tide that lifts all 
boats” (Piketty 2014:16). Furthermore, economists have faithfully upheld the view that 
efficiency and equality are mutually exclusive, and hence attempting to resolve inequality 
through redistributive policies would necessarily require sacrificing the efficient outcome 
generated by the market, while also altering individuals’ future incentives (Claeys et al. 
2015:2). However, in the past few decades, Kuznets’s predictions have failed to materialize 
and the trade-off between equity and efficiency has been deemed less straightforward as 
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 empirical research has demonstrated that high levels of inequality may in fact cripple 
efficiency and, more decisively, economic growth (Deaton 2015:966). Additionally, the list 
of adverse consequences of this phenomenon has drastically extended to include a variety of 
social backlashes such as higher levels of crime, a lack of social cohesion and a greater 
incidence of health-related problems (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010:4). More recently, as this 
paper will observe in Section II, inequality has been rounded up in the lengthy line-up of 
factors accused of provoking the Global Financial Crisis (Blyth 2015:22). 
In turn, this paper analyses whether QE’s attempt to inhibit the crisis played a role in 
increasing inequality. This paper focuses on both wealth and income inequality, and these 
two concepts are used interchangeably due to the presence of a strong overlap between QE’s 
effects on income streams and asset prices. To begin with, Section II of the paper delineates 
the age-old debate on the relationship between conventional monetary policy and inequality 
to establish whether there is a relevant interplay between the two. Section III then proceeds to 
explain the underlying problems that led to the implementation of UMPs and outline QE’s 
core characteristics. Section IV disentangles the complexity behind QE’s processes to 
determine whether this policy has been a “reverse Robin Hood” privileging wealthy financial 
asset owners over the rest of society. This paper argues that QE’s bias towards supporting 
financial markets relative to the rest of the economy determined its responsibility in 
increasing inequality during the post-crisis period and eclipsed the offsetting impacts of its 
weak equalizing channels. Additionally, as the Fed, ECB and BoE have implemented 
different forms of QE in different economic environments, Section V adds to scholarly work 
on the topic by explicitly comparing how these differences shaped inequality in unique ways. 
Finally, Section VI briefly underlines the potential alternatives to QE. 
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 II. Interplays between Inequality and Conventional Monetary Policy 
 
A. Narrow Mandates 
 
During the past few decades, independent central banks pursuing price stability have become 
globally pervasive. Central banks’ independence originates from the theoretical 
understanding that politicians have a tendency to have time-inconsistent preferences due to 
their inability to commit to a firm policy stance. Consequently, this unreliability engenders 
markets’ mistrust and an inflationary bias, which may only be contained by a politically 
sheltered technocratic authority (Barro and Gordon 1983; Kydland and Prescott 1977; Rogoff 
1985). While empirical studies demonstrate the presence of a strong negative correlation 
between the degree of central bank independence and average inflation, in a field antipathetic 
to silver bullets, the separation between politics and monetary policy is a necessary, yet 
insufficient, condition for price stability, and even less so for growth (Jàcome and Mancini-
Griffoli 2014). In fact, central banks’ own credibility also decisively defines the markets’ 
expectations. As argued by Jacomè and Mancini-Griffoli (2014), this credibility stems from 
three essential qualities: “a clear monetary framework”, “central banks’ successful track 
record” and “accountability”. Since the early 1990s, the prioritization of these qualities has 
culminated in the widespread adoption of explicit inflation targets (Roger 2010). Within this 
framework, medium-term inflation targets concede a degree of flexibility allowing for the 
promotion of growth in the short-term (Meyer 2001). Nevertheless, central banks’ actions are 
predominantly restricted by their legal commitment to undertake a hierarchical mandate 
within which inflation has an absolute priority, or a dual mandate, as in the Fed’s case, which 
implies that both maximum employment and inflation are targeted. The confinement of 
central banks’ objectives to narrow targets lessens the arduousness of achieving credibility in 
the face of trade-offs, competing governmental institutions and limited policy tools (Meyer 
2001). As narrowness and credibility remain interconnected, central bankers have been 
unwilling to broaden their targets beyond inflation and unemployment (Georgsson et al. 
2015:24). 
While reductionism is a central trait of neoclassical economic thought, inflation’s 
close to absolute monopoly has repeatedly been challenged for being characterized by a 
narrowness bordering on a counterproductive insularity. Blinder (1988:51), for instance, 
explains that “inflation, like every teen-ager, is greatly misunderstood” as its sacred status 
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 emanates from the scars of past hyperinflations, which may be deemed archaic and 
unsubstantiated in the face of the relevant setbacks that low inflation policies may generate 
for variables ranging from unemployment to growth and, as this paper will argue, inequality. 
Similarly, Stiglitz (2013:257) argues that the adherence to the price stability creed derives 
from Milton Friedman’s powerful monetarist ideology delineating monetary policy’s inability 
to boost growth in the long run. Even though monetarist mandates have perished, this creed 
has persisted thanks to an amalgamation of factors including the financial sector’s “obsession 
with inflation” and its ability to foster policymakers’ own distaste of this phenomenon 
through a methodical “cognitive capture”(Stiglitz 2013:261). The exposure of these fault 
lines, amongst others, has sparked a set of proposals to alter policy mandates through 
measures ranging from a confined modification of the target itself by allowing for higher 
inflation levels to a complete reconfiguration of their nature by using nominal GDP targets 
(Ball 2014; Cooper 2014). 
This fresh breeze of change has rarely entered inequality’s domain, as central bankers 
have customarily taken cover by neglecting equity concerns to remain in line with their 
mandates’ rigid narrowness (Mersch 2014). To understand central bankers’ claim of alleged 
objectivity in the face of inequality, it is essential to distinguish between policies operating 
through inter-temporal and intra-temporal redistributions. Modern central banks’ 
conventional policies affect the economy by adjusting short-term interest rates, which in turn 
determine the incentives to save, borrow and invest. Lowering short-term interest rates, for 
example, promotes a substitution of future spending for current spending by increasing the 
markets’ incentive to borrow and decreasing their incentive to save, thus generating an inter-
temporal or so-called “vertical” redistribution through time (Cœuré 2013). As Cœuré (2013) 
explains, the intra-temporal or “horizontal” distribution of income between individuals at a 
fixed period, on which inequality depends, is currently labelled as “a side effect of a strategy 
which aims at ensuring price stability”. Consequently, progressing into a discussion on QE 
and inequality would be classified as a relatively futile task according to this “collateral 
damage” criterion. Nonetheless, this paper will begin by presenting a case for the relevance 
of inequality in monetary policy debates by demonstrating that there exists a strong interplay 
between inequality and monetary policy since not only do central bankers’ goals influence 
inequality, but also inequality may powerfully challenge the attainment of these same goals. 
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 B. Inequality’s Impact on Monetary Policy 
 
The relationship between monetary policy and inequality has visibly resurfaced as a theme of 
speeches given by renowned central bankers such as Cœuré (2013), Mersch (2014), Haldane 
(2014), Carney (2014), Yellen (2014) and Bullard (2014). This apparent craze has not only 
been driven by the rise of intranational inequality per se, but rather, this concept has surfaced 
in central bankers’ conscience due to mounting evidence of a positive correlation between 
crises and inequality (Moss 2010). Rajan (2010:9), for instance, anecdotally argues that 
stagnant wages amongst lower-income households have repeatedly encouraged governments’ 
conscious or unconscious support of mortgage markets as a form of bipartisan redistribution, 
consequently generating perilous credit booms. Additionally, transcending potential 
accusations of illusory correlation, Kumhof and Rancière (2010:3) empirically test Rajan’s 
hypothesis by looking at the pre-crisis period and confirm that feeble wage growth amongst 
the lowest income deciles of the US forced certain households to increase their exposure to 
debt to unsustainable levels to keep their consumption paths stable. Consequently, as many 
central banks have acquired more explicit responsibilities to sustain financial stability 
following a set of post-crisis reforms, monitoring inequality has become part of their own 
interests (White 2012:36). 
Beyond its implications on financial stability, inequality has also been burdened with 
a plethora of other economic responsibilities specifically relevant to monetary policy. With 
multiple caveats, an abridged list includes factors such as weaker growth, higher inflation 
levels, even in the face of independent central banks, as well as the extreme responsibility of 
causing a loss of cognitive power amongst poorer households, with implications on economic 
productivity (Cingano 2014; Dolmas et al. 1997; Haldane 2014:6). Conforming to its pariah 
status, as Raskin (2013) argues, inequality may also have “clogged some of the channels 
through which monetary policy traditionally works” by depressing demand when central 
banks may want to foster it, as low-income households, who tend to spend relatively more 
than high-income households, have lost ground (Skidelsky 2011:11). Therefore, the vast 
array of economic consequences of inequality intrude within central bankers’ mandates both 
by altering their tools’ effectiveness and by directly shaping their objectives. In turn, as this 
paper has argued that inequality is relevant to monetary policy, it is crucial to determine if the 
opposite case also holds. 
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 C. Conventional Monetary Policy’s Impact on Inequality 
 
When discrediting the common economic modelling assumption that individuals’ wealth and 
incomes are identical across an economy, monetary policy’s transmission mechanism may 
enhance or constrict inequality through five distinct channels: the income composition 
channel, the financial segmentation channel, the portfolio channel, the savings redistribution 
channel and the earnings heterogeneity channel (Mersch 2014). First, the income composition 
channel distinguishes between households whose total revenues are composed by diverse 
shares of wages, government transfers, as well as business and financial income (Airaudo and 
Bossi 2014:3). As shown in Table 1, the bottom twenty per cent (1st wealth quintile) in the 
US gain 78.9 per cent of their income through wages. Meanwhile, the top twenty per cent 
earn only 51.4 per cent of their income through this same source and compensate with a 
larger share of business and financial income, which largely depends on companies’ profits 
(Nakajima 2015:14). A hypothetical expansionary policy, thus lowering interest rates, would 
only maintain inequality constant if all sources of income were equally affected or, in a 
simplified exposition, if wages and profits increased symmetrically. Overall, generalizations 
on the consequences of an expansionary policy on this channel are difficult. This complexity 
is epitomized by the fact that while medium-income households tend to own a 
disproportionate share of their wealth in the housing sector, which benefits from lower 
interest rates, they are also relatively more exposed to the potential losses in the inflation-
fearful manufacturing sector and to a shrink in governmental transfer payments that generally 
follows an expansionary policy (Romer and Romer 1998:23). 
 
Table 1: Sources of Income and Wealth in the United States in 2007 
 Wealth Quintiles Top 
1% 
 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th  
Composition of Income (in %)  
Labor Income (from wages) 78.9 81.2 78.6 77.1 51.4 30.2 
Financial Income (from capital and 
business interests) 
2 4.7 7.2 10.2 39.7 65.7 
Transfer income (from government 
programs) 
15.5 12 12.4 12.1 8.2 3.6 
 
Source: (Nakajima 2015:14) 
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 Second, as changes in the money supply are enforced through financial 
intermediaries, the financial segmentation channel underlines that households with a higher 
level of interaction with financial markets are more directly exposed to changes in monetary 
policy (Prasad 2013). Therefore, during a monetary expansion, as households have different 
levels of participation in financial markets, inequality only remains constant in a system that 
allows an equal permeation of the increase in the money supply throughout the economy. In 
reality though, ambitions of perfect permeation encounter a Kafkaesque castle, and as Ledoit 
(2011:1) explains, “the agent closest to the location where money is injected is better off”, 
thus generally favouring households who interact more frequently with financial institutions. 
Nonetheless, this channel is also not characterized by a definite straightforwardness as 
different types of financial assets have divergent movements following an increase in the 
supply of money induced by a fall in interest rates (Cœuré 2013). Third, the portfolio channel 
underlines the difference arising between households with assets protected from expected 
inflation from those who hold mostly unindexed assets that loose value as inflation increases 
(Coibion et al. 2012:2). Table 2 demonstrates that lower-income households’ relative 
exclusion from financial markets in the US has decisive implications on their bias towards 
holding a large portion of their wealth in inflation-sensitive cash (Erosa and Ventura 2002; 
Nakajima 2015:13). In a scenario where a central bank conducts an expansionary monetary 
policy with inflationary consequences, lower-income households holding cash will suffer 
relative to higher-income households with greater access to assets protected from inflation 
(Nakajima 2015:12). 
 
Table 2: Inflation Sensitivity in the United States in 2014 
 Percent (%) of expenditures paid for 
with: 
Household Income (in $) Cash Debit 
Cards 
Credit 
Cards 
Other 
Less than 25,000 55 31 5 9 
25,000-49,999 29 51 15 5 
50,000-74,999 22 49 24 5 
75,000-99,999 16 46 35 3 
100000-124,999 16 43 37 4 
125,000-199,000 14 40 37 9 
200,000 and above 10 15 66 9 
 
Source: (Nakajima 2015:13) 
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 Nevertheless, the effects of an expansionary monetary policy on inequality are 
ambiguous as the remaining two channels suggest a direct and positive relationship between 
inequality and interest rates, which runs contrary to the previously introduced channel 
(Coibion et al. 2012:3). The savings redistribution channel observes the impact of changes in 
interest rates and unexpected inflation on nominal contracts between borrowers and savers 
(Plihon 2015:4). On average, inflation makes borrowers better off by decreasing the value of 
their loan repayments relative to their inflated incomes, while savers become worse off as the 
amounts of goods that they can purchase with a fixed amount of savings decreases as goods 
become more expensive. Table 3 shows that, on average, low and middle-income households 
in the US are relatively more likely to borrow, thus benefiting more from unexpected 
inflation and lower interest rates compared to wealthier households who are more likely to 
save (Doepke and Schneider 2006; Nakajima 2015:12). Finally, the earnings heterogeneity 
channel underlines that certain households are more exposed to fluctuations in the economy’s 
performance, which in turn is influenced by changes in interest rates (Cœuré 2013). As 
unemployment is more volatile for low-skilled and hence poorer households, an expansionary 
monetary policy decreasing unemployment may be relatively more beneficial for these 
groups (Blinder 1988:36). 
 
Table 3: Net Nominal Position as a Percentage of Net Worth in the United States in 1989 
 Net Nominal Position as a Percentage (%) of Net Worth 
Age of head of household 0 - 
35 
36 -
45 
46 -
55 
56 -
65 
66 -
75 
>75 Unweighted 
Average (all 
ages) 
By household income  
All income levels -42.6 -10.1 2.3 15.2 19.4 30.6  
Poor (bottom 20%) -36.6 -33.8 -5.5 7.5 17.5 26.4 -4.08333 
Middle-class (middle 70%) -114 -31.6 -4.8 14 25.2 38.1 -12.1833 
Rich (top 10%) -14 3.8 6.6 16.3 16.7 27.5 9.483333 
 
Source: (Nakajima 2015:11) 
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 Overall, the literature analysing the short-term relationship between conventional 
monetary policies and inequality has converged towards overweighing the importance of the 
savings redistribution and the earnings heterogeneity channels relative to the other channels 
(Romer and Romer 1998:23). This overweighing stems from the fact that interest rates have a 
decisive and straightforward impact on the relative stance of savers, borrowers, and the 
unemployed. In line with the prioritization of these channels, multiple studies have 
demonstrated a short-term positive correlation between interest rates and inequality, or 
inversely, that expansionary policies decrease inequality (Coibion et al. 2012; Fouda Ekobena 
2014). Airaudo and Bossi (2014:2), for instance, confirm the existence of a relationship 
between contractionary policies and inequality by showing that a one per cent increase in 
interest rates increases the Gini coefficient by about 0.08 percentage points. These figures 
reveal that monetary policy can be a decisive causal factor exacerbating inequality and, in 
turn, challenge central bankers’ current strategy of overlooking this issue in their decision-
making processes. 
When looking at economists’ archetypal distinction between short-run and long-run 
periods, monetary policy’s effects on inequality diverge through time. While in the short run 
conducting an expansionary monetary policy may be a viable path to counter inequality, the 
same policy is considered a Sisyphean effort over the long run (Stiglitz 2013:257). Romer 
and Romer (1998:31), for instance, claim that expansionary “policy has had no impact on the 
average level of poverty; it has only rearranged its timing”. This discrepancy originates from 
neoclassical economists’ faith in money neutrality, which implies that expansionary monetary 
policies attempting to push unemployment levels below an imaginary boundary defined as 
the “natural rate” will only generate temporary booms at the cost of permanently higher 
inflation levels that contractionary policies will have to tame (Romer and Romer 1998:38). 
As expansions are doomed to be offset by contractions, one could argue that the optimal 
policy outcome involves creating a stable environment with low inflation levels, which 
consequently favours capital accumulation, and hence growth (Albanesi 2007; Easterly and 
Fischer 2001; Nakajima 2015:9). 
On the other hand, this line of reasoning controversially presumes the existence and 
relevance of a so-called long-run period, while also indirectly basing the belief of a 
cancelling out of opposite policies on the presence of a historically absent symmetry between 
the lengths of booms and busts (Nakajima 2015:10). Boom and bust cycles do not necessarily 
cancel out, as contractionary policies, on average, have been more prolonged or intense. This 
asymmetry between contractionary and expansionary policies stems from the fact that the 
10
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 13 [], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol13/iss1/1
 former have generally been less effective at taming inflation than expansionary policies have 
been at generating it (Shi et al. 2007:1213). In turn, Coibion et al. (2012:3), for example, 
question the current mantras of monetary policy by demonstrating that, as a permanently low 
inflation target has to be sustained with a recurrent use of contractionary policies, these 
policies have increased inequality in the US throughout multiple boom and bust cycles from 
the 1990s. As they explain, “monetary policy shocks can account for a surprising amount of 
historical cyclical changes in income and consumption inequality (…) the contribution of 
monetary policy shocks to the variance of these variables is also in the 10-20% range for 
most forecasting horizons” within the US (Coibion et al. 2012:23). Overall, one should note 
that blaming central bankers for intentionally creating a framework destined to spur 
inequality would be unsound. Nonetheless, inequality’s paramount importance in terms of 
monetary policy and financial stability should lead one to challenge central bankers’ decision 
not to acknowledge and monitor the distributional consequences of their choices. In turn, this 
paper will outline how the nature and intensity of monetary policy was reconfigured during 
the Global Financial Crisis and the effects these adjustments had on inequality. 
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 III. What is QE? 
 
At the onset of the financial crisis, central banks were challenged by an unconventional 
scenario urging them to react in unconventional ways. As shown in figure 1, when the crisis 
directed the US, the European Union (EU) and the UK towards a state of economic disarray, 
central banks attempted to alleviate the downturn by slashing interest rates to record-low 
levels close to zero (Dobbs et al. 2013:6). In this scenario, central banks could have continued 
their interest rate descent below zero by imposing negative interest rates on bank reserves. 
Negative interest rates imply that banks have to compensate a central bank with interest 
payments for holding reserves, which in theory should spur lending as banks want to 
minimize these payments by diminishing their reserves. Nonetheless, having banks pay 
central banks for holding reserves was deemed ineffective due to the formers’ ability to 
escape interest payments by transforming deposits into currency, which is not liable to 
interest payments, and hence constrains central banks’ ability to influence a banks’ use of 
money (Haldane 2015).2 The need for further action generated by the prospect of deflation in 
a crippled market and the constrained efficacy of conventional monetary policy in the face of 
a zero lower bound (ZLB) forced central banks to augment their range of tools by venturing 
into the domain of UMPs (Benford et al. 2009:90; Fawley and Juvenal 2012). As a report by 
the International Monetary Fund (2013:1) explains, central banks implemented UMPs with 
two related goals: “restore the functioning of financial markets” and “provide further 
monetary policy accommodation at the ZLB”. To achieve the first goal central banks 
aggressively expanded their lending operations, provided liquidity insurance, purchased 
targeted private assets as a means to avoid fire sales or borrowing cost spikes and focused the 
early stages of QE on generating liquidity (IMF 2013:1; Joyce et al. 2010:10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 The relevance of this theoretical constraint has recently been questioned and adopting negative interest rates 
has become more common worldwide (The Economist 2016a). 
12
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 13 [], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol13/iss1/1
 Figure 1: Central Banks’ Policy Rates 
 
Source: (Dobbs et al. 2013:6) 
 
Nevertheless, QE’s implementation was largely justified by the attempt to achieve the 
second objective: enhancing monetary easing (Joyce et al. 2012:274). QE is a process 
whereby a central bank conducts large-scale purchases of private and public sector securities 
acquired predominantly from non-bank companies such as pension funds (Benford et al. 
2009:91; The Economist 2015d). More specifically, central banks generate new electronic 
money, which they channel into financial markets to alter the overall quantity of money in the 
economy. Central banks were not novice practitioners of financial asset purchases as their 
ability to set interest rates or the so-called price of money had previously relied on open 
market operations, which as Breedon et al. (2012:704) explain involved a “swap of central 
bank money for privately held assets”. However, the size and focus of the purchases 
conducted through QE was unprecedented. Traditionally, open market operations were 
devised to have a limited influence on the prices of financial assets, whereas QE’s benefits 
largely relied on snowballing increases in financial asset prices through targeted and vigorous 
rounds of purchases (Gagnon et al. 2010:7). Additionally, while conventional monetary 
policy had considered the quantity of money in the market an indirect by-product of the 
movements in the price of money generated by altering interest rates, QE added a new 
dimension to central banks’ tools by making both the price and quantity of money direct 
13
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 means of stimulating the economy (Benford et al. 2009:90). The quantity component of QE is 
manifestly visible in figures 2 to 4, which depict the drastic expansion of the assets on central 
banks’ balance sheets since the onset of the financial crisis (Fawley and Neely 2013:66-68). 
 
Figure 2: Balance Sheet of the Federal Reserve System 
 
Source: (Fawley and Neely 2013:66) 
Figure 3: Balance Sheet of the European Central Bank 
 
Source: (Fawley and Neely 2013:67) 
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 Figure 4: Balance Sheet of the Bank of England 
 
Source: (Fawley and Neely 2013:68) 
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 IV. QE and Inequality 
 
A. Financial Asset Prices 
 
As Benford et al. (2009:91) explain, central banks expected this monetary injection to 
“ultimately lead to an increase in asset prices and spending, and therefore bring inflation back 
to target” in the medium term. This paper will analyse the channels depicted in figure 5 
through which QE theoretically furthers its expansionary aims. Amidst these channels, the 
portfolio-rebalancing channel, the liquidity channel and the macro-news channel operated by 
pushing financial asset prices upward. 
Firstly, the portfolio-rebalancing channel potently spurred financial asset prices by 
relying on their imperfect substitutability. When central banks conduct asset purchases, they 
increase the sellers’ holdings of money, and consequently alter the portfolio composition of 
banks and non-banks (Green and Lavery 2015:899). If money and the financial assets 
purchased by the central bank are not perfectly substitutable from the sellers’ point of view, 
the seller uses the newly acquired money to purchase financial assets that are more in line 
with the expected risk and return of the previously owned ones. Especially in the US and UK, 
central banks purchased high-yielding financial assets, which were less likely to be 
substitutable with money, whose yield is generally close to non-existent. Consequently, 
sellers’ need to rebalance their portfolios to their prior composition fostered an escalating rise 
in financial asset prices across the markets where substitute assets were searched for (Benford 
et al. 2009:92). 
Figure 5 also portrays the fact that QE targets financial asset prices to bolster 
spending in two additional ways. First, by becoming large and ready asset buyers, central 
banks rehabilitated the ailing levels of liquidity that commonly characterized the markets in 
QE’s early stages (Gagnon et al. 2010:5). Consequently, the liquidity premium expected by 
investors for holding the risk of being unable to sell financial assets decreased together with 
these assets’ yield, and inversely to their rising price (Bowdler and Radia 2012:611). 
Secondly, QE announcements spurred financial asset prices by providing reliable information 
about the future stance of both monetary policy and the economy.3 As Krishnamurthy and 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2011:4) argue, a central bank’s “willingness to undertake an 
                                                          
3 QE’s informatory role was advanced through a symbiotic relationship with forward guidance (Wu 2014:6). 
Forward guidance is a policy involving a central bank’s management of the markets’ expectations through a 
clear communication of its future interaction with the latter (IMF 2013:8). 
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 unconventional policy like QE indicates that it will be willing to hold its policy rate low for 
an extended period”. This signal strengthens the markets’ confidence in a recovery, thus 
lowering multiple risk premia demanded by investors, and consequently pushing financial 
asset prices upward (Joyce et al. 2010:7). 
 
Figure 5: Quantitative Easing’s Channels 
 
Source: Adapted from (Benford et al. 2009:93) 
 
Consequently, QE’s implementation has generated a pattern of increasing asset prices 
within multiple financial markets (Brown 2015:1; Koo 2014:76). While certainty in terms of 
magnitude is not a defining feature of the empirical studies on QE, there exists a shared 
tendency for these undertakings to demonstrate that QE had statistically relevant effects on a 
wide range of asset categories in the financial markets of the three areas under scrutiny 
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 (Williams 2014:10). Empirical research by the BoE, for instance, finds that the first round of 
QE may have raised equity prices in the UK by approximately twenty per cent (Ryan-Collins 
et al. 2013:21). QE’s potency is also epitomized in a survey conducted by UBS’s asset 
management division, which demonstrates that a wide-range of asset managers thought that 
QE was the “number one driver of asset price movements” in multiple markets for a few 
consecutive years following the crisis (Custard 2015:2). 
The most prominent case for QE’s responsibility in worsening inequality stems from 
the implications of financial assets’ price appreciation on households’ wealth. Although 
ownership rates of financial assets are not easily comparable across countries, high-income 
households in the US, EU and UK share a general tendency to own more, and rely more on 
financial assets than middle and low-income households (BoE 2012:10; Claeys et al. 2015:4; 
Yellen 2014). In the UK, for example, the wealthiest five percent own forty per cent of the 
overall financial wealth of households in the country (Forbes 2015:16). Middle-income 
households are in fact less able to afford sophisticated financial services and are relatively 
more fearful of financial market risk (Forbes 2015:16). Therefore, on average, they are less 
likely to hold financial assets and more likely to hold interest-bearing savings, which lost out 
as central banks cut interest rates (Montecino and Epstein 2015:2). Meanwhile, low-income 
households have an infinitesimally small or non-existent financial asset ownership rate, with 
the caveat that they are indirectly exposed to these assets through pensions, which, on 
average, remained unchanged. Higher financial asset prices in fact increased the value of 
pension pots, yet, the gains generated by this rise were offset, or occasionally outbalanced by 
the losses households faced due to a fall in their income streams from annuities (Haldane 
2014:4). Annuity rates are directly related to bond yields, which, as previously explained, QE 
lowers through its targeted asset purchases. Therefore, other things being equal, as QE 
increases financial asset prices, it improves the stance of the wealthiest relative to the rest 
(Bowdler and Radia 2012:613). In the UK’s case, for instance, the BoE (2012:258) crudely 
estimates that QE’s impact on financial asset prices led to an average increase of wealth of 
£10,000 per household when assuming a homogenous ownership rate of financial assets 
across households. Meanwhile, according to Green and Lavery (2015:9), when taking into 
account the disparities in ownership rates existing between households, the wealthiest ten per 
cent of households may have gained between £128,000 and £322,000, contrary to the 
majority who compensated for this disproportionate rise by gaining far less than the £10,000 
average. 
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 There are two caveats one should note. First, low interest rates and forward guidance 
also played a decisive role in lifting financial asset prices in ways that complicate the task of 
disentangling QE’s sole responsibility (Dobbs et al. 2013:25). Second, QE theoretically only 
increases financial asset prices in the short run, while over the long run, it loses its relevance 
because central banks may have to reverse their stimulus and rational investors determine 
financial asset prices by looking at so-called “real forces”, such as the constancy of economic 
growth and companies’ profitability, which QE cannot determine sustainably (Bivens 
2015b:18). As Bernanke (2015) argues, “the Fed's actions have not led to permanent 
increases in stock prices, but instead have returned them to trend”. In turn, this would imply 
that QE did not increase inequality in the long run, but only re-established the pre-crisis 
levels of inequality by normalizing financial asset prices, and by reversing the fall in 
inequality that, all else being equal, the crisis generated by enfeebling financial asset owners 
relative to the rest. 
Central bankers have repeatedly taken refuge against accusations of fomenting 
inequality by hiding behind this line of reasoning, which is backed by the fact that in the post-
crisis period financial markets in the US, EU and UK have not decisively surpassed their 
historical averages for a range of ratios used by analysts to calculate assets’ valuations 
(Claeys et al. 2015:3). Nevertheless, as is often the case, not all things are equal, and the 
crisis’s crippling effects transcended financial markets and spread to other sectors of the 
economy, thus harming households across a wider spectrum. QE’s objective was to follow a 
similar path as the crisis, from financial markets to the wider economy, yet, it aimed to prop 
up the former to reinvigorate the latter. Overall, central banks utilized a so-called 
financialised demand strategy, thus their actions were heavily biased towards supporting 
financial markets, with the hope that the benefits reaped by these markets would trickle-down 
into the broader economy (Watkins 2014:438). Under certain conditions, higher financial 
asset prices would have boosted spending by reducing borrowing costs and by increasing 
financial asset owners’ wealth (Joyce et al. 2010:6). As Joyce et al. (2011:202) show in figure 
6, following QE’s initial “impact phase”, the “stimulus from asset purchases works through 
the economy” in a so-called “adjustment phase” where asset prices normalize, while real 
GDP and inflation rise through time until the economy returns to an equilibrium level. If QE 
failed to transmit its stimulus beyond financial markets, its biased procedures may be blamed 
for having privileged wealthy financial asset owners’ recovery, while leaving the rest of the 
economy behind, at least in the short run when financial asset prices do not necessarily adjust 
with the rest of the economy’s inferior performance. 
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 Figure 6: Trickle-Down Effect of Real Asset Prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Joyce et al. 2011:202) 
 
Nonetheless, as Section II underlines, one should always be critical of economists’ 
archetypal distinction between the short run and the long run. Divergences between financial 
markets and the economy do not necessarily extinguish over time, and the increased levels of 
inequality arising from financial asset owners’ privileged position may persist for a longer 
period than the one subtly suggested by the term “short run”. Financial markets’ rally relative 
to the rest of the economy, for instance, may be prolonged by the fact that the finance 
industry per se composes an important portion of developed economies’ total economic 
output (London Economics 2009). In turn, this industry’s superior performance may partially 
offset financial asset prices’ theoretical convergence with the potentially inferior performance 
of the rest of the economy. Additionally, central bankers’ ingrained financial market bias may 
lead them to postpone a long-run convergence towards a lower performance by extending 
asset purchases even further or by never reversing past QE purchases. Consequently, this 
paper will look at QE’s effects on the economy as a whole to understand whether a 
divergence between financial markets and the rest of the economy materialized. However, 
before proceeding into an economy-wide analysis of QE’s implications, this paper will first 
note that QE may also have shaped inequality by lowering mortgage costs and by reflating 
house prices. 
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 B. Mortgages and House Prices 
 
QE also intended to foster lending, or at least reduce debtors’ burden, by directly lowering 
borrowing costs. More specifically, targeted purchases of debt-related assets reassured 
lenders, and consequently decreased mortgage rates. In the UK, for instance, these rates 
dropped by 322 points between 2007 and 2012 thanks to the conjunct efforts of QE and 
conventional monetary policy (Lund et al. 2013:30). In turn, as Bernanke (2015) argues, 
“debtors are generally poorer than creditors, so on this count easier monetary policy again 
reduces inequality”. This statement though is far too simplistic when applied to the US, or 
when stretched beyond Bernanke’s intended remit by looking at the EU and UK. In the US, 
for instance, while low-income households have a higher exposure to debt as a percentage of 
their total income relative to their wealthier peers, they are also largely unable to benefit from 
lower mortgage rates (Doepke et al. 2015). This is caused by the fact that the vast majority of 
mortgage contracts in the US have a fixed rate (Fuster 2015). In turn, the rate is determined at 
the time of signing the contract with a lender and does not adapt to changes in mortgage 
markets. Therefore, fixed-rate mortgage owners do not directly benefit from lower rates, but 
rather have to get a new mortgage to refinance their existing one, and hence reap the benefits 
of lower rates (Fuster 2015). Nonetheless, following the crisis, regulators and lenders jointly 
tightened the equity and income requirements that borrowers have to fulfil to obtain a 
mortgage, thus strongly favouring wealthier households who are more likely to satisfy the 
stricter set of criteria (Beraja et al. 2015:28). Beraja et al. (2015), for instance, demonstrate 
that mortgage refinancing occurred to a greater extent in wealthier areas of the US relative to 
poorer ones and, in turn, this difference visibly increased consumption inequality following 
QE’s implementation. 
Meanwhile, the UK differs from the US both for the fact that it’s higher and middle-
income households are relatively more exposed to debt than low-income ones and because its 
households predominantly use adjustable-rate mortgages, implying that they directly benefit 
from lower rates (Anderson et al. 2014:431; Tracy and Wright 2012). As upper and middle-
income households are proportionally more exposed to debt, they are the major beneficiaries 
of the lower mortgage rates generated by QE. On the other hand, in the EU, households with 
lower-incomes are typically more exposed to debt relative to the rest, yet generalizations on 
the effects of lower borrowing costs on inequality in the EU are rendered complex by the 
diverse levels of usage of variable and fixed-rate mortgages in different European states 
(Claeys et al. 2015:7; Panetta 2015:5). Overall, QE’s implications on inequality through 
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 mortgage rates lack the straightforwardness necessary to counter QE’s impact on inequality 
through financial asset prices, and, instead, may occasionally heighten these asset prices’ 
effects by also favouring the wealthy over the poor. 
Historically, falls in mortgage rates have been closely correlated with higher house 
prices, and hence an appreciation of property wealth, which, as Figure 7 shows, composes 
one of the largest sources of households’ total wealth in the US, EU and UK (Lund et al. 
2013:28). In the UK, for instance, research conducted by the BoE demonstrates that the low 
mortgage rates induced by both QE and conventional monetary policy reflated house prices 
by between fifteen and twenty percent, thus cancelling the fall in prices provoked by the 
crisis (Bivens 2015a). Additionally, in the UK, houses are a “democratically” held asset, as 
they compose a larger percentage of total income for low and middle-income households 
relative to households in the highest echelons of the income distribution (Bivens 2015b:14; 
ONS 2014:12). Therefore, higher house prices should theoretically have equalizing effects. 
Nonetheless, as figure 8 demonstrates, when decomposing home-ownership rates even 
further, one can see that property wealth amongst the lowest income quintile is heavily 
skewed towards a small minority, as more than half of this group is property-less, and hence, 
exposed to the higher private sector rents fostered by rising house prices (ONS 2014:12; The 
Economist 2014). One should also note that house prices are not uniformly affected by QE, 
as tighter credit constraints impede many low and middle-income households from taking out 
a mortgage, thus choking the demand pressure on the lower and middle-quality houses owned 
by these households. As Doepke et al. (2015:5) explain, credit constraints may counter the 
equalizing effect of higher house prices by generating a scenario where “the price of 
relatively high-quality houses increases, whereas the price of mid-level houses remains 
essentially unchanged”. On the other hand, in the US and EU, while property wealth does 
compose a larger proportion of the total wealth of middle-class households relative to the 
wealthiest ones, poorer households are close to property-less and do not benefit from higher 
house prices (Bernoth et al. 2015:13; Bivens 2015b:16).4 Furthermore, contrary to the UK, 
house prices in the US and EU have remained sluggish by failing to recover to their pre-crisis 
levels as an oversupply of housing and elevated levels of household indebtedness played a 
crucial role in constraining price pressures within these markets (Lund et al. 2013:29; The 
Economist 2015a). Once again, while QE may have played a role in spurring asset prices that 
                                                          
4 Due to differences in data collection methodologies, the relevance of home ownership per household in the 
three areas under study cannot be compared directly. 
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 are not decisively relevant to the wealthiest households in society, the implications of this 
effect for low and middle-income households do not point towards a clear equalizing effect 
capable of countering the impact of financial asset prices on inequality. 
 
Figure 7: Household Wealth by Source in 2012 
 
Note to reader: numbers do not sum up to 100% due to rounding 
Source: (Dobbs et al. 2013:28) 
Figure 8: Distribution of Household Net Property Wealth, by Total Household Income 
Quintile: Great Britain, 2010-12 
 
Note to reader: numbers do not sum up to 100% due to rounding  
Source: (ONS 2014:12) 
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 C. Trickle-Down Economics: From Financial Markets to the Rest 
 
In Piketty’s magnum opus Capital in the Twenty-First Century, a grand theory on the 
principal cause of inequality is derived by looking at the difference between the rate of return 
of capital “r” and economic growth “g”. Piketty (2014:245) shows that the ownership of 
capital, which is used interchangeably with the concept of wealth, is more concentrated 
amongst the richest cohorts of society than the distribution of labour incomes. Consequently, 
Piketty (2014:424) argues that when “r > g”, there will be an increase in inequality as the 
capital owned by wealthy households grows at a faster pace than labour incomes, which 
depend on economic growth (Atkinson 2015:158). Piketty’s central finding is that the rate of 
return on capital, on average, has surpassed the rate of growth in the past decades, thus 
contributing to the sustained increases in wealth inequality experienced in most developed 
countries. One should note that Piketty’s (2014:358) definition of capital extends beyond 
financial assets to include factors ranging from rents to profits; nonetheless, he acknowledges 
that in the twenty-first century, financial capital has composed a very large portion of total 
capital. 
Ultimately, when looking at QE through Piketty’s lenses, establishing whether this 
policy increased or decreased inequality largely depends on whether its benefits spread 
beyond financial markets to reach the rest of the economy, on which a wider range of 
households rely. As previously explained, low and middle-income households obtain a larger 
percentage of their income from wages relative to financial and business income (Claeys 
2015:9). Additionally, poorer households are more susceptible to business cycles, thus they 
are far more likely to become unemployed during a downturn than wealthier households are, 
and inversely, as unemployment falls thanks to a stimulus, these same households will, on 
average, face a faster level of wage growth (Bivens 2015b:29). Therefore, if QE revitalized 
the wider economy by decreasing unemployment and by raising wages, it may have had 
equalizing effects, as these two variables determine a large fraction of the welfare of poor and 
middle-income households, when compared to wealthier ones (Bernanke 2015; Panetta 
2015:4). 
Nonetheless, recoveries in the US, EU and UK have largely been characterized by 
delayed rises in employment levels, by slow reinstatements of the pre-crisis output growth 
trends and by stagnant real wages (Chen et al. 2011:2; Koo 2014:4; Montecino and Epstein 
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 2015:4; Wolf 2014:264).5 It is important to note that adequately assessing QE’s effects on the 
economy requires one to compare the current scenario with QE to a theoretical counterfactual 
or base scenario without QE (Panetta 2015:4). QE’s benefits have in fact been partially 
hidden by the recession. More specifically, while this policy did not necessarily increase 
wages or decrease unemployment levels, it may have played a subtle role in preventing a 
greater collapse of these figures (BoE 2012:256). Nonetheless, when considering 
counterfactual scenarios, as figure 9 shows, for instance, the US’s recovery would have been 
slower, yet only slightly so, if the Fed had not implemented QE (Blinder and Zandi 2015; 
Sandbu 2015). More generally, the jury is still out on QE’s impact on GDP, wages and 
unemployment (Conaghan 2012:231). Empirical studies on these variables have in fact 
largely failed to reach a consensus, while instead producing a set of approximations 
fluctuating on a relatively wide spectrum (Martin and Milas 2012). 
 
Figure 9: Effect of the Post-Crisis Policies Implemented in the United States 
 
Source: (Blinder and Zandi 2015; Sandbu 2015) 
 
 
                                                          
5 Although the recoveries have been more pronounced in the US and UK than in the EU, this statement gives a 
general representation of QE’s average effects across the three areas under study. 
25
bianchi: Quantitative Easing and Inequality After the Financial Crisis
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU,
 Overall, QE’s effectiveness has been less pronounced and certain in terms of real 
economy indicators than in the domain of financial asset prices. Ryan-Collins et al. (2013:1), 
for instance, argue that QE “inflates the price of such (financial) assets, and enriches the 
assets’ owners, with minimal positive impact on the real economy”. Although QE cannot be 
held accountable for singlehandedly spurring this divergence, in the UK, for instance, the real 
output of the business and financial services industry relative to the real output of the 
construction and manufacturing industries, as well as the performance of overall GDP, have 
visibly differed following the crisis (Ryan-Collins et al. 2013:7). Backing the interpretation 
that QE played a role in this divergence, Watkins (2014:431) contentiously states that QE 
“represents the triumph of pecuniary values over service, financial interests over industrial 
interests and asset holders over income earners”. Similarly, yet from a moderate stance, a 
group of 19 renowned economists notably published a letter on the Financial Times asking 
the ECB to recognize that QE had been “an unreliable tool for boosting GDP or 
unemployment”, and hence had to be substituted with a new expansionary approach devised 
to “bypass the financial system” (Chick et al. 2015). To comprehend the foundations of these 
arguments one has to observe QE’s transmission mechanism. 
As Irwin (2014) explains, the divergence appearing between the superior performance 
of financial markets and the relative feebleness of the rest of the economy originates from a 
“paradox” at the core of central banks’ foundation: the mandates focus on real economy 
indicators, whereas their transmission channels largely rely on financial markets. As Figure 5 
shows, QE furthered its expansionary aims indirectly by operating through financial markets, 
and more specifically, three out of its four central channels revolved around increasing 
financial asset prices.6 Nonetheless, trickle-down economics, which is the idea that enriching 
the wealthy eventually generates benefits for the whole of society, faced a renewed setback 
(Chang 2011:137; Stiglitz 2013:6). Financial markets and their wealthy participants in fact 
largely retained the benefits accrued from QE, as the decisive expansion in central banks’ 
balance sheets failed to revive the wider economy, yet succeeded in increasing financial asset 
prices. In turn, when looking at QE from Piketty’s perspective, as QE fostered financial 
capital returns and failed to bolster economic growth, it enhanced the pre-existing divergence 
between “r” and “g”, and hence increased inequality. 
 
                                                          
6 One should note that QE also lowered exchange rates and government borrowing costs, yet these effects 
remain relatively contentious and insufficiently researched. 
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 D. The Bank Lending Channel 
 
Figure 5 also shows that QE theoretically could have boosted the wider economy directly, 
thus without necessarily relying on a trickle-down effect from higher financial asset prices. 
This process should have occurred through the bank lending channel. In practice, the 
electronic money created by QE generated large bank deposits as the vast majority of 
financial assets purchased were owned by non-bank companies but were transacted through 
banks (Butt et al. 2015). Deposits are an inexpensive source of funding and the increase in 
deposits largely exceeded banks’ demand for liquidity, hence, this increase should have 
fostered an expansion of lending (Benford et al. 2009:93). Nonetheless, despite the spikes in 
banks’ excess reserves, a combination of factors constrained banks’ incentive to lend and the 
markets’ incentive to borrow to the extent that academics have repeatedly classified this 
channel with the label of irrelevance (Butt et al. 2015). Figures 10 to 12 elucidate this trend 
by demonstrating a visible and rare divergence between the rise in the overall money in the 
economy or so-called broad money generated by QE’s liquidity injections and the far lower 
levels of credit creation (Koo 2014:6-8). In the UK’s case, for example, the moribund levels 
of credit creation prompted the BoE to incentivize lending further through the Funding for 
Lending scheme, which prizes banks according to their lending performance (BoE 2015). 
 
Figure 10: Credit Creation and the Monetary Base in the United States 
 
Source: (Koo 2014:6) 
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 Figure 11: Credit Creation and the Monetary Base in the European Union 
 
Source: (Koo 2014:7) 
Figure 12: Credit Creation and the Monetary Base in the United Kingdom 
 
Source: (Koo 2014:8) 
 
There are multiple culprits generating feeble levels of bank lending. Koo (2014:16) 
has argued that during a balance sheet recession characterized by a collapse in asset prices, it 
is common for the private sector to “switch from maximising profit to minimizing debt”. 
Counterintuitively, low rates and elevated liquidity levels do not always entice borrowers as 
saving and repaying loans become prevalent attitudes that critically inhibit the relevance of 
an expansionary monetary policy (Koo 2014:14). Accompanying low borrowing demand, 
banks created supply-side deficiencies as their confidence to lend decreased in line with the 
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 anaemic post-crisis recoveries and with the convergence of the gap existing between long and 
short-term rates, on which their lending profitability relies (Goodhart and Ashworth 
2012:666). Additionally, Butt et al. (2015) argue that the irrelevance of the bank lending 
channel may depend on the fact that the large deposits created by QE cannot be used as stable 
sources of funds due to the recurrent rebalancing of portfolios towards higher yields 
throughout the banking system, which consequently renders the nature of deposits 
excessively “flighty” for profitable lending to occur. As argued by Ryan-Collins et al. 
(2013:31), “bank lending is a key driver of nominal GDP”, and hence the feebleness of this 
channel played a decisive role in constraining QE’s efficacy on the wider economy. 
Consequently, even though this channel was meant to stimulate the economy directly, due to 
its weakness, it failed to contrast the divergence between the relative performances of 
financial markets and the wider economy. 
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 V. Comparing Different QE Formats 
 
While until now this paper has referred to a broad notion of QE, when looking at figures 2 to 
4 one notes that the timings, intensities and compositions of QE varied in the US, EU and 
UK, thus generating different implications for inequality (Fawley and Neely 2013:66-68). 
Central banks’ idiosyncratic choices were shaped by the differences in the structures of the 
financial systems, the nature of the recessions, the political pressures and the pre-existing 
legal constraints faced by these institutions (Hausken and Ncube 2013:65). The ECB’s 
implementation of QE, for instance, has differed in two visible ways from the QE 
programmes executed in the US and UK, which are more akin to each other.7 First, as shown 
in Table 4, the size of the ECB’s QE programme relative to GDP remained relatively small 
during the first years of the post-crisis period (Fawley and Neeley 2013:77; Szczerbowicz 
and Valla 2015). The ECB’s restrained stance largely stemmed from its previously more 
optimistic assessment of the crisis and from the legal challenges imposed by the Maastricht 
Treaty (Kang et al. 2016; Klyuev et al. 2009:17). Second, as banks are the most important 
source of funding in Europe, the ECB attempted to encourage bank lending by focusing its 
purchases on refinancing banks to decrease their fear of engaging in this activity (Wyplosz 
2014). Consequently, the ECB’s initial indecisiveness and its focus on bank lending at a time 
with low demand for loans severely constrained QE’s effectiveness in Europe when 
compared to the US and UK. This ineffectiveness may have played a role in generating the 
relatively slower economic recovery that characterized the EU in the post-crisis period 
(Hausken and Ncube 2013:65; Wyplosz 2014). Nonetheless, one should not be led to 
conclude that this slower recovery generated higher levels of inequality, as QE’s relative 
inefficacy was also experienced by European financial markets, which recovered at a slower 
pace than the ones in the US and UK (Middeldorp and Wood 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 The QE programmes carried out in the US and UK are similar in terms of size relative to GDP and centrepiece 
focus on government bonds. 
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 Table 4: Sizes of the Asset Purchase Programmes up to December 2012 
Centra
l Bank 
Programme Assets 
Purchased 
Peak 
Size 
(Billion
) 
Peak 
Size 
(Billio
n 
USD) 
2008 
GDP 
(Billion
) 
Share of 
the 
Econom
y (%) 
Fed QE1 GSE Agency 
Debt 
$175  $14292 1.2 
MBS $1250   8.7 
Treasuries $300   2.1 
QE2 Treasuries $600   4.2 
Maturity 
Extension 
Programme 
Treasuries $667   4.7 
QE3 MBS $160   1.1 
Treasuries 0   0 
BoE APF Gilts £375 $590 £1,441 26 
Commercial 
Paper 
£1.97 $3.1  0.1 
Corporate Bonds £1.60 $2.52  0.1 
ECB CBPP Covered Bonds € 60 $81 € 9,219 0.7 
 SMP Euro Area 
Sovereign Debt 
€ 220 $297  2.4 
CBPP2 Covered Bonds € 40 $54  0.4 
 
Fed 
Total 
  $3152 $3153  22.1 
BoE 
Total 
  £379 $596  26.3 
ECB 
Total 
  £320 $432  3.5 
 
Source: (Fawley and Neeley 2013:77) 
 
One may also compare the Fed’s QE programme with the one conducted by the BoE. 
The former’s focus on purchasing risky mortgage-backed securities to support the heavily hit 
housing market has in fact been deemed more effective at boosting economic growth when 
compared to the latter’s programme, which is relatively more centred on safer government 
bond purchases (Szczerbowicz and Valla 2015). Overall though, as QE is a somewhat new 
and unfamiliar policy, the literature comparing different QE formats remains very limited. In 
turn, asserting whether a divergence between the performances of financial markets and the 
rest of the economy has been more visible in one of the areas under study would lead one to 
reach faulty conclusions. Therefore, discerning how different configurations of QE affect 
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 inequality in different ways is a task that calls for future research to allow policymakers to 
design their policies in more optimal ways. 
 
VI. Alternatives 
 
During the past few decades, the collapse of average long-term rates has increased the 
likelihood of central banks having to face deflation traps at the ZLB (Haldane 2015). In turn, 
as conventional monetary policies remain feeble in these scenarios, QE is likely to gain a 
prominent stance in future policymaking. Nonetheless, together with inequality, QE poses a 
plethora of relevant threats as its implementation may delay structural reforms, distort 
financial market signals, undermine central bank’s independence and compromise the future 
potency of conventional monetary policy (Joyce 2012:54; Koo 2014:100). Compounding 
these risks, the consequences of reversing QE policies remain close to untested, and hence 
central banks’ exit strategies are currently surrounded by perilous levels of uncertainty 
(Marron 2013; Treanor 2013).  
These risks have encouraged a search for alternative policies that may halt QE’s entry 
into the realm of conventionality. Amongst central bankers, proposals to revamp monetary 
policies have ranged from moderate plans to test negative interest rates, to more extreme 
proposals to increase inflation targets or abolish paper currency altogether (Haldane 2015; 
The Economist 2016b; Wolf 2016). On the other hand, outside of central bankers’ sphere, 
support for a policy proposal named “QE for the people”, a variant of Friedman’s “helicopter 
money”, has gathered momentum (Blyth and Lonergan 2014). This policy involves having 
central banks electronically create money to be distributed directly and irreversibly to 
households rather than to financial markets (Blyth and Lonergan 2014). Whether the 
distribution is conducted by the central bank or in conjunction with a government, this policy 
has been deemed more likely to increase spending in the economy than QE. Money handouts, 
for instance, may be designed in a way that favours low and middle-income households who 
are proportionally greater spenders than their wealthier peers are (Blyth and Lonergan 2014). 
Nonetheless, this policy’s short-term effectiveness is eclipsed by its long-term risks, as its 
implementation could undermine the public’s faith in the currency and in central banks’ 
commitment to price stability (Cumming 2015). Ideological concerns on the ethicality of 
handouts and central bankers’ straitjacketed dependence on maintaining an allegedly 
apolitical and credible stance are also likely to trump this policy’s future (Muellbauer 2014; 
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 The Economist 2015c). Overall, while this policy is unlikely to gain traction within central 
bankers’ circles, its radical essence and the impetus of its backers reveal the elevated levels of 
discontent towards monetary policy’s current response to the crisis. 
The acknowledgement that central banks’ tools have been blunted by the weight of 
the crisis also reinforces the case for addressing the imbalance between the use of fiscal and 
monetary policies that has characterized the post-crisis period. As Bivens (2015b:23) 
demonstrates in figure 13, for instance, in the most recent recession, “total government 
expenditures have risen more slowly than during any other post World War II business cycle” 
in the US. To different extents, partisan divisions and budget stringencies have stifled the use 
of fiscal policies in the US, EU and UK, thus leaving a large demand for expansionary 
stimulus to be supplied by the more expedited decisions taken by central bankers (Blyth and 
Lonergan 2014). Although one may not clearly establish the extent to which fiscal policy’s 
relative lethargy determined monetary policy’s need to redefine its boundaries, the latter’s 
venturesome stance may partially originate from the need to complement or even substitute 
the former’s role (Bernanke 2002; Bivens 2015b:24). To counter this process, the Bank for 
International Settlements (2012:3), amongst others, has called for greater caution when using 
UMPs, while also advocating for governments to support central banks with fiscal policies, as 
the latter risk being overburdened by market expectations that far exceed UMPs’ uncertain 
potential. More importantly, as elected officials design fiscal policies, they are arguably more 
likely to take into account, and be held accountable for the distributional implications of their 
decisions than central bankers are (Green and Lavery 2015:10). 
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 Figure 13: Real Government Spending During Recessions and Recoveries in the United 
States
 
Source: (Bivens 2015b:23) 
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 VII. Conclusion 
 
Within many developed economies, increasing levels of inequality have opened a number of 
fault lines threatening the sustenance of economic growth, social cohesion and democracy 
(Deaton 2015:978; Motesharrei et al. 2014:99). This paper does not argue that monetary 
policy should be directly responsible for addressing this overall rise in inequality. However, 
as inequality affects central bankers’ objectives and monetary policy intrinsically has 
distributional implications, central bankers should acknowledge, monitor and mitigate their 
role in shaping this trend. 
This paper cannot provide an indication of the extent to which QE caused inequality, 
as the outcomes of the empirical literature attempting to measure QE’s impacts remain 
diverse and uncertain. Nonetheless, this paper argues that QE’s design shaped the direction of 
its effects on inequality. More specifically, central bankers structured this policy with a bias 
towards supporting financial markets relative to the rest of the economy. This bias originates 
from the central role played by financial asset prices in QE’s transmission mechanism and it 
is reinforced by the weakness of the bank lending channel. As the gains received by financial 
markets failed to spread towards the rest of the economy, QE favoured wealthy households 
who are more reliant on financial asset prices relative to low and middle-income households. 
Furthermore, this paper notes that QE may theoretically have had some equalizing effects by 
lowering borrowing costs and by reflating house prices. Nevertheless, these equalizing effects 
are relatively ambiguous and weak when compared to QE’s dis-equalizing effects through 
financial asset prices. To sum up, when adjoining these findings with Section II’s conclusion 
that contractionary monetary policies generally increase inequality, middle and low-income 
households find themselves in a paradoxical scenario where, as Montecino and Epstein 
(2015:25) explain, “given the current structure of the economy and monetary policy 
strategies, both loose and tight monetary policy are likely to be dis-equalizing”. In turn, if 
further expansionary policies are needed at the ZLB, central bankers should counter this 
paradox by re-designing or substituting QE with mechanisms reflecting a greater awareness 
of the distributional consequences of their choices. 
When looking beyond the scope of this paper, QE’s relative novelty provides a fertile 
ground for future research. Research investigating QE’s role in altering intergenerational and 
international inequality, for instance, is virtually absent. Nonetheless, the arguments in favour 
of the current pertinence of these issues are compelling. In terms of intergenerational 
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 inequality, for instance, the elevated concentration of financial asset holdings amongst older 
households has guided the preliminary hypothesis that QE may have potently disadvantaged 
younger households (BoE 2012:259). Meanwhile, in terms of international inequality, QE’s 
intent of favouring growth in the US, EU and UK has eerily revived memories of the 
devaluation policies that followed the 1929 Great Depression, as countries implementing QE 
have transferred some of the post-crisis readjustment costs on emerging economies by 
making the latter’s exports relatively less attractive (Eichengreen 2013:4). In turn, alarming 
calls that QE may fuel a so-called “currency war” have become common within academia, 
finance ministries and G7 summits (Rickards 2011:124). Flattening the meaningful risks 
posed by these forms of inequality is a task that will have to rely on more in-depth research 
investigating QE’s potent distributional effects. Additionally, while this paper has focused 
exclusively on QE, future research should also look at the interaction between inequality and 
other UMPs implemented by central banks during the post-crisis period. 
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